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I. INTRODUCTION
"The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the
essence of a democratic society.. . ."1 For minorities, the path to full

realization of this right has been long and tortuous-as long and tortuous, perhaps, as the boundaries of North Carolina's controversial
twelfth congressional district which, in 1992, gathered up enough
black voters to give the state one of its first black representatives to
Congress since Reconstruction. 2
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REvIEw.
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
2. North Carolina sent two black representatives to the United States House of Representatives in 1992. Mel Watt, a black Democrat, won election in the twelfth
congressional district, while Eva Clayton, also a black Democrat, won election in

383
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During its 1993 term, the Supreme Court held in Shaw v. Reno3
that North Carolina's winding congressional district and majority-minority districts4 like it can be challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.5 In doing so, the Court ignited a national debate over the wisdom of creating legislative districts for historically-disadvantaged
minority populations in an effort to increase their representation in
government. The decision has far-reaching effects, jeopardizing not
only the validity of majority-minority districts6 but the very mechanism which led to their creation: the Voting Rights Act of 1965.7
This Note analyzes the Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno and examines its impact on the Court's prior voting rights jurisprudence. It begins by tracing the history of voting rights litigation from the groundbreaking reapportionment cases of the 1960s to the enactment and
interpretation of the Voting Rights Act and its amendments.8 The
Note then sets forth the facts, issues, arguments, and holding of
Shaw. It continues by delineating the principles established by the
Supreme Court in its earlier voting rights cases 9 and criticizing
Shaw's retreat from these principles. This Note concludes that the
Supreme Court has promulgated unworkable standards for the newlycreated constitutional claim announced in Shaw. By rejecting goals of
group empowerment and placing undue emphasis on aesthetic districting criteria, the Court creates disharmony between the dictates of
the Voting Rights Act and the principles of the Fourteenth Amendthe state's first congressional district. The two became North Carolina's first
black representatives to Congress this century. Whither Shall It Wander?, THE
ECONOMIST, July 10-16, 1993, at 18, 19.
3. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
4. "Majority-minority district" is a term used by courts to describe an election district where a racial or ethnic minority constitutes a majority of the population.
DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: CoMPARATIVE AND

5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 159 (1992).
"No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
After the 1992 census alone, states across the country created 26 majority-minority congressional districts, and 13 more blacks and 6 more Latinos won seats in
the House of Representatives. Whither Shall It Wander?, supra note 2, at 19.
These additional representatives bring the total number of minority members of
Congress to 56. David Van Biema, Snakes or Ladders?, TIME, July 12, 1993, at
30. The use of majority-minority districts is prevalent in districting for state legislatures and municipal governments as well.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p (1988).
The Voting Rights Act was amended and extended in 1970, 1975, and 1982. The
1970 amendments can be found at Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314. The 1975
amendments can be found at Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400. The 1982 amendments are located at Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
See discussion infra subsection II.B.1.
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ment, thus paralyzing state efforts'O to achieve meaningful inclusion
of all populations in government."
H. BACKGROUND
A.

State Reapportionment and One Person, One Vote

The Supreme Court took its first step into the "political thicket"12
of state apportionmenti 3 plans in 1962 when it decided Baker v.
Carr,"4 an historic case in which Tennessee voters challenged the
state's apportionment of seats in the state legislature. Rejecting its
earlier position that a dispute over state election districting presented
a nonjusticiable "political question,"' 5 the Court in Baker discerned in
the Equal Protection Clause manageable judicial standards by which
the constitutionality of the state's apportionment plan could be
judged. "Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are
well developed and familiar," the Court concluded, "and it has been
open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination
reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action."' 6 Thus,
the Court allowed the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
proceed.
Baker cleared the way for more active judicial review of state election procedures. Shortly after Baker, the Court in Gray v. Sanders'7
struck down Georgia's unit voting system' 8 which had the effect of
10. For purposes of this Note, "state" districting efforts also include the districting
undertaken by state political subdivisions such as counties and cities.
11. The lack of discussion of the dissenting opinions in this Note is not meant to
imply a lack of esteem for the arguments advanced in them. The opinions of Justice White and Justice Souter, in particular, lend well-reasoned insight into the
debate over whether the Fourteenth Amendment or previous Supreme Court decisions require strict scrutiny of race-based districts. Nevertheless, the focus of
this Note is on the disharmony between the majority's equal protection analysis
in Shaw and the dictates of the Voting Rights Act. It does not attempt to re-open
the equal protection debate between the majority and minority in Shaw.
12. Justice Frankfurter used these words in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1976),
when he declined to intervene in a challenge to an Illinois congressional districting plan. Frankfurter feared that judicial evaluation of the claim would amount
to encroachment upon state legislative powers and concluded, therefore, that
"[clourts ought not to enter this political thicket." Id. at 556.
13. Apportionment is defined as "the process of allocating congressional districts
across states." BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 4, at 156.
14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
17. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
18. Georgia's voting system allocated varying units to counties for purposes of vote
counting in Democratic primaries. Two units were allocated to counties with
populations of 0-15,000 people, an additional unit was allotted for the next 5,000
persons, one additional unit for the next 10,000 persons, another for the next
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weighting the votes of certain Georgia citizens differently based upon
county residency. In Gray, the Court held that "[t]he conception of
political equality . . . can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote."19
The Court took this definition of political equality a step further in
Reynolds v. Sims2O when it applied the "one person, one vote" standard to a suit against Alabama's apportionment of state legislative
seats. In Reynolds, the state's districting scheme had remained unchanged from its enactment in 1900 until the suit was brought in
1960. During that time, the state's population had grown unevenly,
producing districts of vastly disproportionate numbers of voters. The
Reynolds majority determined that "every citizen has an inalienable
right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his
State's legislative bodies,"21 and that, in a representative government,
this right could be realized only if all citizens stood "in the same relation" to their government. 2 2 Because the right to full and effective
participation is impaired if the weight of a citizen's vote is "diluted
when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the
State,"23 the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause mandates
that seats in all houses of state legislatures be apportioned on a population basis.24
The reapportionment cases established an individual's right to an
equally-weighted vote as the starting point for adjudicating state districting plans. In addition, they opened the door for more ambitious
judicial oversight of the range of state voting procedures which impact
voting rights even while adhering to notions of population equality.
B.

The Voting Rights Act

Supreme Court rulings espousing egalitarian principles and the
right of each person to an equally-weighted vote could do little to curtail the pervasiveness of racial discrimination which was embedded in
state election practices by the 1960s. Since the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment,25 states had built up an arsenal of techniques
designed to impede black registration and voting. Grandfather

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

15,000 persons, and two units for each population increase of 30,000 thereafter.
All candidates for statewide office were required to receive a majority of the
county unit votes to receive nomination in the primary. Id. at 372.
Id. at 381.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Enacted in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
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clauses, literacy tests, property qualifications, and "good character"
tests became popular methods of systematically depriving blacks of

their right to vote. 26 Gerrymandering, 2 7 traditionally a partisan districting device, was adopted by states and other political subdivisions
28
to obstruct black efforts to achieve legislative representation.
29
Although the Supreme Court struck down many of these techniques
and Congress passed various forms of anti-discrimination legislation,3 0 voter registration records in the early sixties reported black
voter registration up to fy percentage points behind registration of

whites.31
It was against this background of "unremitting and ingenious defi-

ance of the Constitution"3 2 that Congress passed the Voting Rights

Act of 1965.33 Hailed as "one of the most monumental laws in the

entire history of American freedom," 34 the Act was designed to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting"35 and achieve the extension of the franchise which the Fifteenth Amendment and previous

legislative and judicial efforts had been unable to accomplish. The
Voting Rights Act suspended literacy tests and other devices designed
or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to
26.

27.

28.
29.

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.

enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, §§ 1-2.
See Karen McGill Arrington, The Struggle to Gain the Right to Vote: 1787-1965,
in VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERIcA: CONTINUING THE QUEST FOR FULL PARTICIPATION
25, 29-31 (1992). See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311
(1966)(carefully implemented literacy testing systems allowed states to exclude
the two-thirds of adult blacks who were illiterate while still including illiterate
white voters through alternate tests).
Gerrymandering is defined as:
the process of dividing a state or other territory into the authorized civil
or political subdivisions, but with such a geographical arrangement as to
accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose, as, for instance, to secure a
majority for a given political party in districts where the result would be
otherwise if they were divided according to obvious natural lines.
BLACes LAW DICTIONARY 687 (6th ed. 1990).
See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965)(prohibiting discriminatory voting tests); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)(striking down all-white
primaries); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)(invalidating grandfather
clauses).
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966).
Id. For a more detailed illustration of the gap between registration of whites and
blacks, see CHAs
V. HAMITON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT 238, Table H
(1973).
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 19 7 3 -1 9 7 3 p (1988).
D. GAnRow, PROTEST AT SELmA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, Jr., AND TH VOTING
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 132 (1978)(quoting President Lyndon Johnson).
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
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to discriminate against voters on the basis of color.3 6 In addition, it
implemented a controversial tool for curbing the creation of new discriminatory devices. Anticipating that those with a demonstrated history of voting discrimination would "try similar maneuvers in the
future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act,"37 Congress included in the Act provisions applicable only to suspect areas.3 8 Under section 5 of the Act,39 "covered
jurisdictions"40 are prohibited from enacting a new voting procedure
pending scrutiny by federal officials that the procedure "does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color .... 41
Unlike previous attempts to remedy voting discrimination, the
Voting Rights Act was largely successful in securing to minority voters
the promises of the Fifteenth Amendment. Minority voter registration
increased dramatically until by the 1970s the disparity between black
and white voter registration in several of the section 5 states closed to
below ten percent. 42 Yet the Voting Rights Act encompassed goals of
effective participation which reached beyond the immediate objective
of achieving greater minority voter registration. It is these goals
which create the nexus between the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
Court's population-based reapportionment cases.
1.

Vote Dilution

In Reynolds, the Court wrote that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just
as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise." 43 This assumption was quickly adopted and expanded in
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973h (1988). See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966) (explaining the purposes of the Act).
37. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966).
38. The Act's provisions restricting state changes to election practices in targeted areas were immediately challenged on the ground that they "exceed[ed] the powers
of Congress and encroach[ed] on an area reserved to the States by the Constitution." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966). The Supreme
Court nevertheless upheld all of these provisions, concluding that "the Fifteenth
Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power," and expressly gives
Congress the power to enact legislation to enforce the Amendments provisions.
Id. at 325.
39. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
40. A covered jurisdiction is any state or political subdivision of a state which is
deemed to meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) by having maintained
on one of the statute's designated dates a voting test or device and a minority
voter registration figure below fifty percent. For a list of jurisdictions requiring
preclearance of voting changes, see 28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (1993).

41. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
42. A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CouNT? AFFnm
ING RIGHTS 44 (1987).

43. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).

TrE ACrION AND MiNORrrY VOT-
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cases interpreting the Voting Rights Act. In Allen v. State Board of
Elections,4 4 the Supreme Court relied on Reynolds in holding that
state election practices which had the effect of diluting minority voting
strength violated section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.45 The Court's use
of "dilution" in Allen, however, evidenced a meaning distinct from that
used in the cases guaranteeing citizens equally-weighted votes. 46 As

voting rights theorist Pamela Karlan explains, the reapportionment
cases and the cases under the Voting Rights Act in fact establish two
separate theories of vote dilution.4 7 The first, "quantitative" dilution,
includes the one person, one vote principle. These cases are "'based
solely on a mathematical analysis' that shows that the votes of persons in one district are devalued relative to the votes of persons in a
less-populated district." s "Qualitative" vote dilution, on the other
hand, results when the election practice "impairs the political effectiveness of an identifiable subgroup of the electorate."49 Because the
latter kind of vote dilution focuses on the "quality" rather than the
weight of votes,50 qualitative vote dilution can occur even in cases
where absolute population equality exists.
Cases invoking the protections and remedies of the Voting Rights
Act, particularly section 5 and, most recently, amended section 2 of
the Act, concentrate on "qualitative" vote dilution. Consequently,
these cases have redefined the meaning of the right to vote.
2. Section 5
The section 5 preclearance provision has been described as "the
heart of the Voting Rights Act."51 Though it imposes upon covered
states a "severe requirement,"52 the Court has nevertheless held that
the section is to be given the "broadest possible scope."5 3 Accordingly,
44. 393 U.s. 544 (1969).

45. Id. at 569.
46. In Allen v. State Boardof Elections, the Court focused not on population disparities but on voting procedural changes which, although respecting notions of population equality, nevertheless "nullify' the ability of minority voters "to elect

candidates of their choice .... " Id.

47. Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of GeographicCompactness
in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Ray. 173, 176 (1989).
Karlan is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law.

Id. at 173.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 176 (citing Nevitt v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Id. (emphasis added).
See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142 (1971).
Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Questfor PoliticalEquality, 77 VA. L.
REv. 1413, 1419 (1991).

52. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 502 (1977).
53. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969).
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a wide range of voting practices and procedures have been held to require preclearance under the Act.54

Although the Court had little difficulty defining what practices required preclearance under section 5, it had more trouble determining
when these practices had the effect or purpose of denying or abridging
the right to vote. In 1976, the Court finally articulated its standards
for measuring a section 5 violation. In Beer v. United States,55 the
City of New Orleans brought suit under section 5 seeking a declaratory judgment that its municipal voting plan, enacted after the 1970
census, did not violate the standards of section 5. Noting that under
the 1961 plan none of the city's five city council districts had a majority of black voters, while under the new plan blacks would constitute a
majority population in two of the districts, the Court upheld the plan.
The Court reasoned that a reapportionment plan which improved the
position of minorities could not logically be said to dilute or abridge
the voting rights of minority citizens and therefore held that section 5
prohibited only those changes in voting procedures which "would lead
to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to
their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." 56
The Court's standard of nonretrogression for section 5 cases was
reaffirmed in City ofLockhart v. United States.57 It remains a cornerstone principle for state legislators revising state voting plans and
drives much of the litigation brought under the Voting Rights Act.58
3. Section 2
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,59 like section 5, has become a
key provision of the Act. Unlike section 5, which limits its coverage to
specific areas, the provisions of section 2 apply nationwide to all state
and state political subdivisions. While its original language generated
little controversy, congressional amendments to the provision in 1982
proved to play a substantial role in reshaping the concept of the
franchise.
54. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (holding that
extension of a city's boundaries through annexation requires section 5
preclearance); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971)(requiring section 5
preclearance of all changes in the location of polling places). Allen itself held that
preclearance was required when a state sought to initiate a change from singlemember to multimember districts, from election to appointment of certain offi-

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

cials, and from lower to higher candidate eligibility standards. Allen v. State Bd.
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1969).
425 U.S. 130 (1976).
Id. at 141.
460 U.S. 125 (1983).
For a thorough discussion of section 5 and the "nonretrogression" standard, see
Hiroshi Motomura, PreclearanceUnder Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61
N.C. L. REy. 189 (1983).
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
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The significance of the 1982 amendments is most apparent when
placed against the backdrop of cases which led to their adoption. In
1980, the Supreme Court interpreted the original wording of section
260 in City of Mobile v. Bolden,61 a case attacking the City of Mobile's
at-large election scheme 62 under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
The Court in Bolden found that section 2 "was intended to have an
effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself"63 and

therefore based its decision to uphold the City's plan on constitutional
grounds. Relying on earlier equal protection cases which explored the
requirements for making out a valid equal protection claim,64 the
Court then held that without proof that the plan embodied "purposeful
discrimination,"65 the plan violated neither the Equal Protection
Clause nor the Fifteenth Amendment.
Concerned that the decision in Bolden would undermine the Act's
ability to combat vote dilution,66 Congress acted quickly after Bolden
to amend section 2.67 The new provision drew heavily from preBolden cases which had relied upon broad principles of minority inclusion in their evaluation of vote dilution claims.68 Amended section 2
60. As originally enacted, section 2 provided:

61.
62.

63.
64.

65.
66.

67.
68.

No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965)(codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
446 U.S. 55 (1980).
In an election at-large, also known as an election from a multimember district, all
voters of a town, county, or other jurisdiction vote for all of the members of the
legislative body seeking election. Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in
MinorityVoting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1249, 1257 (1989). In a school board atlarge election, for example, where six seats. are open, each voter may cast six
votes but may only cast one of the six votes for a particular candidate. Out of the
candidates running, the six who receive more than fifty percent of the votes will
be elected.
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980).
Among other cases, the Court relied heavily on Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976), and Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1975), in its analysis in Bolden.
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980).
In a report issued with the section 2 amendments, the Senate stated that City of
Mobile v. Bolden's intent requirement "focus[ed] on the wrong question and
place[d] an unacceptable burden upon plaintiffs in voting discrimination cases."
S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 16 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 194.
Congress enacted its revised version of section 2 in 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96
Stat. 131 (1982).
See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973)(invalidating a multimember
districting scheme using a "totality of the circumstances" test which incorporated
"an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the... multimember
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established a "results" test which eliminated any requirement that the
challenging litigant show discriminatory intent.69 Under the new
terms of section 2, a violation would be established if the "totality of
the circumstances" demonstrated
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision [were] not equally open to participation by members of a
class [of protected citizens] in that its members ha[d] less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to 7participate
in the political process and to
0
elect representative of their choice.
In Thornburg v. Gingles,7 1 the Supreme Court articulated pre-

cisely when the "totality of the circumstances" would precipitate a
finding of unlawful vote dilution under section 2. Gingles involved a
challenge to North Carolina's 1982 redistricting plan apportioning the
seats of the state Senate and House of Representatives. Black citizens
of North Carolina had attacked seven districts in the plan-one single-member district72 and six multimember73 districts-on the
grounds that they "impaired black citizens' ability to elect representatives of their choice . . ... "74
The Supreme Court was no stranger to the unusual potential of
multimember districts to have a dilutive effect on minority voting
strength, having explored their suspect use in several cases before
Gingles.7 5 The Court reiterated these concerns in Gingles, noting the
danger that in multimember districts "the majority, by virtue of its
numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of minority
voters."76 Nevertheless, as it had in the past, the Court stopped short
of deciding that multimember districts were violative of minority voters' rights per se, holding instead that unless a block voting majority
is usually able to defeat the choices of minority voters, the "totality of
the circumstances" test would not be met.7 7 Instead, to prove section

2 vote dilution through use of multimember districts, the Court de-

69.
70.
71.
72.

district in light of past and present reality... ."); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d
1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973)(listing factors plaintiffs must establish in order to
prove vote dilution). The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to
section 2 describes the Zimmer factors as the "typical" factors courts should look
to in evaluating whether a section 2 violation has occurred. S. REP. No. 417, 97th
Congress., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 28-29 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C-AN. 206-07.
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(1988).
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
A single-member district is a district "electing only one representative." BUTLER
& CAiN, supra note 4, at 160.

73. See supra note 62.
74. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).

75. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-17 (1982); White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 157-59 (1971); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
76. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48 (1986).

77. Id. at 69.
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cided that the minority group must demonstrate: (1) that it is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district;"78 (2) that it is "politically cohesive;"79 and (3)
that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a block to enable it...
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."80
The Gingles preconditions have made single-member districting
plans the norm as states strive to comply with section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.81 This change in state districting theory and Gingles' emphasis on group cohesiveness, as recognized and reinforced through
majority-minority districts, have reshaped the contours of vote dilution cases over the past decade.
HI. SHAW v. RENO-A NEW ERA?
Against this background the Supreme Court announced its decision in Shaw v. Reno.S2 While Shaw has its roots in both population
reapportionment cases and vote dilution cases, in striking down various affirmative action programs and other race classifications, it borrows its tenor and rationale from recent equal protection decisions.83
The case involves, according to Justice O'Connor, who penned the decision for the majority, "two of the most complex and sensitive issues
this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional
right to vote, and the propriety of race-based state legislation designed
to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority
groups."84

A.

Facts of Shaw v. Reno

In 1990, as a result of population increases reflected in the 1990
federal census, North Carolina became entitled to an additional seat
in the United States House of Representatives.85 The state's General
78. Id. at 50.
79. Id. at 51.
80. Id.
81. See discussion infra section IV.B.
82. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
83. The Court in Shaw was particularly influenced by Richmond v. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493-94, 500 (1989), a case which invalidated Richmond, Virginia's requirement that prime contractors subcontract a portion of their contracts to minority-owned businesses, and by Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S.
267, 277-78 (1986), a case striking down a city plan giving preferential lay-off
protection to minority school personnel. These cases held that strict scrutiny of
affirmative action plans would only be satisfied when the plan was enacted to
address specific discrimination in the industry or governmental unit in question
and not when enacted to remedy societal discrimination alone.
84. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (1993).
85. Under the 1980 census, North Carolina was entitled to 11 Congressional seats.
The 1990 census increased that number to 12 representatives. Id.
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Assembly accordingly passed legislation to redistrict the state into
twelve congressional districts. The plan included one district in the
northeastern part of the state that had a majority black voting age
population.
Because forty of North Carolina's one hundred counties are covered
by the preclearance provisions of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,86
the General Assembly submitted its redistricting plan to the United
States Attorney General for approval. The Attorney General formally
objected to the plan, voicing concern that the state had failed to "give
effect to black and Native American voting strength" in the south-central to southeastern region of the state.8 7 The Attorney General believed the state's minority population in those areas could support a
second majority-minority district.
Rather than seek a declaratory judgment to have the original plan
implemented notwithstanding the Attorney General's objection, the
General Assembly revised its redistricting plan, this time creating two
majority black districts. Again, the Assembly submitted its plan to
the Attorney General. This time, the Attorney General expressed no
objections. Many North Carolina citizens, however, were not as easily
satisfied.88 In 1991, five North Carolina residents8 9 brought suit
against the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Secretary of State of
North Carolina, the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections,
and the United States Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division,90 claiming that the second plan violated several provisions of the United States Constitution including
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It was the shape of the plan's two minority districts which most
offended the plaintiffs. One of the two districts, Congressional District
86. See supra note 40.
87. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 463 (E.D.N.C. 1992)(quoting Letter of John R.
Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Tiare B. Smiley,
Special Deputy Attorney General, State of North Carolina (Dec. 18, 1991)).
88. Prior to the initiation of Shaw v. Reno, 113 U.S. 2816 (1993), the Republican
Party of North Carolina and several other plaintiffs challenged the plan under
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), alleging that it constituted a political
gerrymander. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992). The Supreme
Court summarily affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim. Pope v.
Blue, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). The issues and arguments addressed in Pope v. Blue
and other political gerrymandering cases are distinct from the issues in Shaw,
and are beyond the scope of this Note.
89. The plaintiffs in Shaw are all residents and registered voters of Durham County,
North Carolina. Before the challenged redistricting, all had been registered to
vote in the same district. Under the new plan, two would vote in District 12 and
three would vote in District 2. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2821 (1993).
90. Id.
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1, has been described as "somewhat hook shaped,"91 or, more bluntly,
akin to a "Rorschach ink-blot test."9 2 It rests primarily in the northeastern part of the state, but its "finger-like extensions"9 3 reach almost to the South Carolina border. The second district, District 12, is
now the more famous of the two. Drawn along Interstate Highway 85,
District 12 stretches diagonally across the state from Durham to Gastonia for approximately 160 miles, dividing precincts, counties, and
towns. 94 Its irregular shape has earned it the nickname "the snake"95
and has prompted one state representative to remark, "You could
drive down 1-85 with both doors open and kill everybody in the
district."9 6
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that by drawing districts
along racial lines without regard to any other considerations, the Assembly had created a racial gerrymander97 in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Such a plan, they contended, deprived plaintiffs of
their right to participate in a "colorblind" electoral process.9 8
The three-judge district court9 dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint
upon the defendants' motion, Oo concluding that the plaintiffs failed to
state a cognizable claim. The district court held that the plaintiffs had
failed to allege an essential element in an equal protection claim:
"that the redistricting plan was adopted with the purpose and effect of
discriminating against white voters.., on account of their race." 10 1
In addition, the district court found that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate the requisite discriminatory effect: that the plan had acted to fence out white voters from the political process or to minimize
91. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1992)(Voorhees, J., dissenting).
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993).
Id. at 2820-21.
Van Biema, supra note 6, at 30.
Id. at 31 (quote attributed to State Representative Mickey Michaux).
See supra note 27.
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1988), a three-judge panel must be convened when an
action is filed challenging the constitutionality of a state apportionment plan.
100. Both the federal and the state defendants moved for dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. The federal defendants also invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), alleging a lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 19731(b) (1988), which gives the District Court for the District of Columbia exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin actions taken by federal officers pursuant to the Voting Rights Act. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 463, 467 (E.D.N.C. 1992). The
district court's actions as to the jurisdictional issue is beyond the scope of this
Note. This Note focuses only on the Supreme Court's review of the district court's
12(b)(6) dismissal.
101. Id. at 472.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:383

or unfairly cancel out white voting strength.10 2 The plaintiffs ap03
pealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.'
B.

The Majority Opinion

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
district court. Because of the difficulty of distinguishing when a racebased measure is "benign" or "remedial" and when it is "motivated by
04
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics,'1
the Court held that redistricting legislation which either expressly
distinguishes between races or is "unexplainable on grounds other
than race" 10 5 must meet the same strict scrutiny required of all other
racial classifications. Thus, a plaintiff may state a cognizable claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that a reapportionment
plan, "though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood
as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification.106
The Court found support for requiring strict scrutiny of raciallymotivated districts in racial gerrymandering cases decided prior to the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act. One of these cases, Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,107 had struck down Tuskegee, Alabama's attempt to
"fenc[e] Negro citizens out of town,"' 0 8 and thereby out of their municipal voting rights, by changing Tuskegee's municipal boundaries from
a square to an "uncouth twenty-eight sided figure."109 Although
Gomillion was decided under the Fifteenth Amendment, the Shaw
majority noted that Justice Whittaker's concurring opinion had concluded that the bizarre district effectuated an unconstitutional segregation of races in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.110 While
acknowledging that a racial gerrymander would not always be easy to
prove,"'1 the Court in Shaw found that deviations from "traditional
districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for
102. Id. at 473.
103. Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from a three-judge district
court panel is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
104. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993)(internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id. at 2825 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 2828.
107. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
108. Id. at 341.
109. Id. at 340.
110. Id. at 349.
111. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826 (1993). The Court points to Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57 (1964), to illustrate the difficulty in proving racial gerrymandering. In Wright, the Court held that, because "conflicting inferences" could
be drawn from the shape of the districts in question, the Court was precluded
from finding that the challenged district lines were racially-motivated.
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political subdivisions""12 provide especially telling evidence of racially-motivated districting. Although the Court adhered to its earlier
views that compliance with such "traditional" districting principles is
not constitutionally required, it nevertheless decided that respect for
these principles might save majority-minority districts from a racial
3
gerrymandering claim."i
Although the majority opinion focused primarily on the general
dangers of race classifications rather than on a lengthy discussion of
precedent, it was necessary for the Court to distinguish at least one
case which both the district court and the dissenters felt barred the
plaintiffs' claims. This case, United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,114 involved the state of New York's apportionment plan for congressional, state senate, and state assembly
seats. In UJO, New York had submitted a reapportionment plan to
the Department of Justice pursuant to its obligation under section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act and had received in return a formal objection
from the Attorney General expressing concern that the plan had a
dilutive effect on minority voting strength. New York subsequently
overcame the Department's objections by creating "more substantial
nonwhite majorities""i 5 in two senate districts. In order to accomplish
this result, the state split a community of Hasidic Jews into two districts. Members of this Jewish community challenged the plan, alleging that it would dilute the value of their votes "solely for the purpose
of achieving a racial quota""16 in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
The Court in UJO rejected the plaintiffs' claim. Writing for the
plurality, Justice White rejected the proposition that racially-motivated districting was per se unconstitutional and, in fact, found that
"the Constitution does not prevent a state subject to the Voting Rights
Act from deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with Section 5."117 Further, the opinion held, it was not
unconstitutional for states to decide how much of a black majority
would satisfy section 5.118 Finally, because the petitioners could not
prove that the plan did more than meet requirements of nonretrogression and because "there was no fencing out of the white population
from participation in the political processes of the county,""19 the
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
Id. at 2818.
430 U.S. 144 (1977)[hereinafter UJO].
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 165.
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Court held that the plan did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments.
Although the Shaw majority admitted that in many ways UJO
"closely resembles"120 Shaw, they read UJO's "highly fractured decision"12 1 as merely providing a standard whereby white voters can establish vote dilution. According to Justice O'Connor, such a
framework does not apply where voters allege that a reapportionment
plan is "so irrational22on its face that it immediately offends principles
of racial equality."1
After rejecting the argument that the claim as stated was barred
by UJO, Justice O'Connor contemplated what strict scrutiny would
require in reapportionment cases brought under the "analytically distinct"123 constitutional claim recognized by Shaw. It is this dicta
which gives Voting Rights Act experts pause because it questions
whether a state's districts will satisfy strict scrutiny even if drawn to
comply with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act or, independently,
to accomplish a remedy for past discrimination.12 4 Although the
Court acknowledged that states have a "very strong interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally
valid as interpreted and as applied,"'12 5 it cautioned that "courts must
bear in mind what the law permits, and what it requires."'126 Having
crafted disharmony between the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause and the parameters of the Voting Rights Act, the Court then
declined to further consider the problem and instead left its resolution
to the lower court on remand.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Shaw, the Court abandons its prior commitment to group voting
rights and to the majority-minority district as the primary means of
combatting vote dilution. In doing so, the Court places its holding in
Shaw in direct conflict with the principles embodied in the Voting
Rights Act without providing manageable standards by which to resolve that conflict. The rivalry of these competing principles promises
to paralyze state efforts to effectuate inclusion of all people in govern120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829 (1993).
Id. at 2829.
Id.
Id.
The state appellees argued that they had a compelling state interest, independent of their interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act, in "eradicating the
effects of past racial discrimination." Id. at 2831. The Shaw Court left this argument for consideration on remand.
125. Id. at 2830.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
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ment and thereby achieve the Supreme Court's "colorblind" election
ideal.
A. Voting as a Group Right
One of the key distinctions between the "quantitative" right to vote
and the "qualitative" right to vote is the latter's recognition that mathematical equality does not ensure that the broadest goals of representative democracy will be accomplished. As Justice Stevens explained
in the reapportionment case of Karcher v. Daggett,12 7 "[m]ere numerical equality is not a sufficient guarantee of equal representation.
Although it directly protects individuals, it protects groups only indirectly at best."'128 Litigators of vote dilution claims have emphasized
this reality, and the Supreme Court has embraced it. Borrowing from
Reynold's concept of "full and effective participation,"' 2 9 the Court's
vote dilution cases forge an expansive concept of the franchise.
In the aggregate, the Court's vote dilution cases both implicitly and
explicitly acknowledge that when voters enter the voting booth they
take with them not only their equally-weighted vote but "their political, racial, ethnic, and socioecnomic affiliations and interests."' 3 0
With this respect for group interests comes the Court's gradual yet
discernible development of group voting rights.
Nowhere is the concept of group rights more apparent than in the
Voting Rights Act and the cases interpreting it. The rich history behind the Act reveals a commitment by both Congress and the Court to
equal political opportunity for disadvantaged groups at every stage of
the political process and at all levels of government.131 Prominent
voting rights lawyer Lani Guinier elaborates:
It is evident from the statutory scheme that the Voting Rights Act was conceived to respond to both political equality and empowerment visions....
[T]he statute's broad political equality and empowerment norms, which incor127. 462 U.S. 725 (1983)(Steven, J., concurring.) Karcher involved a challenge to a
New Jersey reapportionment plan which evidenced slight population deviations
among districts. The plaintiffs alleged that although the deviations were small,
the state had not made a good faith effort to achieve population equality. On that
basis, the Supreme Court declared the plan unconstitutional.
128. Id. at 752.
129. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
130. Karlan, supra note 47, at 179. The Court's decisions often examine thoroughly
the complaining group's employment, health, and educational status to determine whether interests particularly relevant to them receive adequate attention
in the voting scheme at issue. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 762-70
(1973)(describing interests unique to black and Latino populations in Texas).
131. Congress' decisive enactment of the Voting Rights Act highlighted its frustration
over the "ingenuity and dedication of those determined to circumvent the guarantees of the 15th Amendment" and its determination to free minority voters from
"the near-tyranny of nonrepresentation." H. R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.N. 2437, 2441, 2482.
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porate both an equality and an empowerment dynamic, focus on the rights of
protected voters to limit the extent to which government may disadvantage
or their interests through voting practices,
specific voters, groups of voters,
132
standards, and procedures.

The Court's Voting Rights Act opinions manifest a similar interpretation of the goals and principles of the Act. By framing vote dilution
cases in terms of "minority voting strength'1 3 3 and "loss of political
power through vote dilution,"'13 4 the Court elevates empowerment visions over narrower visions of mathematical equality.
Shaw represents a definite departure from this expansive con3
struct of voting. The majority's emphasis on the "special harms"'1 5
which it believes accompany race districting implicitly rejects the special benefits which have been attributed to inclusion of various group
interests in political processes and outcomes.13 6 Suddenly, the majority finds that maximizing group interests through majority-minority
37
Jusdistricts threatens to "balkanize us into competing factions."'
tice O'Connor's emotionally-laden rhetoric13s signifies not only a retreat from group interests but a resignation from empowerment
visions. As such, it is both inconsistent with previous Supreme Court
cases and incompatible with the tool the Court itself has created to
boost group representation: the majority-minority district.
B. The Requirements of the Voting Rights Act
While a review of vote dilution cases over the past three decades
reveals an expansive concept of voting, it conversely reveals a surprisingly narrow view of how vote dilution should be remedied. Because
of the nature of vote dilution and the remedy first fashioned to address
132. Guinier, supra note 51, at 1421-23.
133. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1993); Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 85 (1986)(O'Connor, J., concurring).
134. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 57 (1986).
135. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993).
136. According to Pamela Karlan, inclusion brings "a sense of connectedness to the
community and of equal political dignity; greater readiness to acquiesce in governmental decisions and hence broader consent and legitimacy; and more informed, equitable and intelligent governmental decisionmaking." Karlan, supra
note 47, at 180. Indeed, whenever the Court considers whether a group's voting
strength has been "diluted" or "cancelled out," it at the same time makes the
assumption that undiluted group voting strength, which accomplishes adequate
governmental representation of minority interests, is a valuable objective.
137. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
138. In several parts of the opinion, Justice O'Connor uses language with emotional
overtones. "It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the
most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past," O'Connor writes. Id. at 2824.
"A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to
the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries.., bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid."
Id. at 2827.
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it, the Supreme Court has cornered states into believing that they
must draw single-member districts wherever possible in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act.
The battery of vote dilution cases illustrates that many election
practices can have the effect of diluting a particular group's voting
strength and denying them the ability to elect candidates of their
choice.' 3 9 By far the most popular method employed by states to
achieve vote dilution, however, has been the use of multimember election districts.140 Because of their winner-take-all rules, multimember
districts ensure that a bloc-voting majority'41 can consistently cancel
out minority votes for other candidates. Consequently, majority interand minority interests are left withests are often over-represented,
42
out a voice in government.1
Because vote dilution has traditionally taken the form of multimember districting, the remedy recommended for vote dilution has
traditionally taken the form of mandated single-member districts and,
in many cases, majority-minority districts. The Gingles Court's approach to amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act most clearly illustrates this phenomenon. In order to articulate when the "totality of
the circumstances" demonstrated minority vote dilution, the Court in
Gingles found it necessary to establish a base measurement of "undiluted" voting strength.14 3 The Court chose a framework whereby "undiluted voting strength" is calculated by how many representatives of
their choice a minority group "could potentially elect in the hypothetical district or districts in which it constitutes a majority."14 4 In a vote
dilution claim brought by black voters, for example, the Court would
measure "submergence of black voter strength by its converse: the
ability to elect black candidates from majority-black districts."'145
139. See id. at 2840 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White explains that districting
schemes which "crack," "stack" or "pack" minority groups may all have the effect
of diluting a group's voting strength.
140. See supra note 62.
141. Racial bloc voting occurs when one race consistently prefers a different candidate
from the candidate preferred by another race, and votes sufficiently as a bloc so
that the preference is significantly reflected in the outcome of an election. For a

thorough account of the dilutive effects of multimember districts when race is the
primary determinant of voting behavior, see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
52-61 (1986).
142. In the hypothetical schoolboard election described supra, note 62, if, in the multimember district the population is thirty percent African-American and seventy
percent white, the African-American population alone would never be able to

elect a candidate of its race.
143. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478

U.S.

30, 50 n.17 (1986), ("Unless minority voters

possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged
structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or
practice.").

144. Id. at 90-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Guinier, supra note 51, at 1424-25.
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Since the Court itself visualizes the creation of majority-minority
districts as the antithesis of vote dilution, it is not surprising that the
states have incorporated the same framework into their reapportionment plans. Particularly after the 1990 census, states began drawing
majority-minority districts in an effort to comply with what the
Supreme Court had led them to believe was required by section 2 and
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. With analyses vastly different from
that applied in Shaw, the Court has upheld these state plans, most
46
In Voinovich, a unanimous Court
recently in Voinovich v. Quilter.1
reversed a district court decision which had held that majority-minority districts could only be created to remedy section 2 violations. In
doing so, the Court reminded the parties that while "the federal courts
may not order the creation of majority-minority districts unless necesthat does not mean the
sary to remedy a violation of federal law..,
47
state's powers are similarly limited."'
Though hardly unaware of the fact that states and municipal bodies have read the Court's Voting Rights Act cases as mandating the
creation of majority-minority districts whenever possible,148 the Shaw
majority avoids the substance of this argument, leaving the issue for
the lower courts to tackle on remand. Nevertheless, the Court does
not fully resist calling this reading into question. Justice O'Connor's
brief discussion of the Voting Rights Act in relation to North Carolina's reapportionment plan clearly implies that drawing these districts in a reapportionment plan, while not unconstitutional per se, is
something the Act "permits" but does not require.149 As such, use of
these racially-motivated districts would be unlikely to satisfy strict
scrutiny in an equal protection challenge.15 0
By avoiding the crucial issue of when states may create majorityminority districts and relegating arguments over compliance with the
Voting Rights Act to dicta, the Court throws the future of dozens of
election districts into a state of uncertainty. Yet the Court leaves little guidance, save that which may be extracted from the Court's preoccupation with aesthetic districting criteria, by which states may
146. 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
147. Id. at 1156.
148. The argument that majority-minority districts were to be created whenever possible appeared, for example, in Voinovich. Id. at 1153. Yet it was not until its
1993-94 term, when the Court held that failure to maximize majority-minority
districts was not the measure of a section 2 violation, that the Court began to
address the substance of this position. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647
(1994).
149. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2830-31 (1993).
150. "A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding
retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid
retrogression." Id. at 2831.
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evaluate their districts for consistency with the Court's holding in
Shaw and with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act.
C. The States' Dilemma
In Shaw, the Supreme Court insists that states are not constitutionally required to adhere to criteria of "compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions."' 5 ' Nevertheless, a careful reading
of Shaw will reveal no other standards by which to distinguish an unconstitutional majority-minority district from one which does not warrant a Shaw equal protection challenge. By raising subjective
geographic criteria to constitutional levels, the Court creates a judicially-unmanageable standard by which to judge the viability of majority-minority districts.
Foremost among Shaw's unanswered questions over geographic
compactness is just how "bizarre" or "uncouth" a district must be to
subject it to an equal protection challenge. Although such labels invoke powerful images, a brief probe behind them illustrates that they
will be of limited helpfulness in future voting rights litigation. For
example, if segregation by race without justification is unconstitutional, why should it matter whether that segregation is accomplished
by a snake-like district or by a circle or square? 5 2 Put differently, if
53
reapportionment is "one area in which appearances do matter,"' just

how much and at precisely what point do they matter? North Carolina's "snake" was deemed suspect because it divided counties, precincts, and towns, yet prior to Shaw the Court had recognized that
many legitimate considerations-such as balancing rural and urban
representation and protecting incumbents54-justified a sacrifice of
geographic integrity in districting. As the majority in Gaffney v. Cummings' 5 5 aptly explained:
151. Id. at 2827.
152. See id. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting)("Given two districts drawn on similar, racebased grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by
virtue of being snake-like, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned .. .
153. Id. at 2827.
154. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)(approving district variations
which preserved a balance between political parties); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964)(expressing concern over failure to balance rural, urban, and suburban
interests); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964)(recognizing legitimate state
interest in protecting seats of incumbents).
155. 412 U.S. 735 (1973). Gaffney involved a challenge to the Connecticut redistricting plan's population variances. In formulating the plan, the Connecticut Apportionment Board had looked at previous statewide election results and created on
that basis what was attempted to be a proportionate number of Republican and
Democratic legislative seats. Id. at 738. In rejecting the equal protection challenge, the Court held:

[N]either we nor the district courts have a constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan.., because it undertakes, not to minimize or elimi-
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[Ilt requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather than another. It is not only obvious,
but absolutely unavoidable, that the location and shape of districts may well
determine the political
complexion of the area. District lines are rarely neu156
tral phenomena.
District lines, in other words, are not necessarily as determinative of
impermissible racial motives as the Shaw majority seems to believe.
The Court's failure to mention its prior case law acknowledging legitimate reasons for irregular districting is perhaps not its greatest
omission, however. More conspicuously absent is any discussion of
districting considerations which, although not strictly race-based, are
at least to some degree race-linked. Socioeconomic status is a prime
example of one such consideration. Utilizing socioeconomic proffles is
certainly one means of creating districts which presumably reflect a
commonality of interests within district populations. Yet in many
states, including North Carolina,157 differences in socioeconomic status seem inextricably linked to racial or ethnic background.158 Shaw's
narrow holding seems to leave room for states or local governments to
justify their districting schemes with evidence that nonracial concerns, rather than their racial correlations, actually led to the creation
of the districting plan. Yet the Court leaves no clear guidance for
lower courts to evaluate any of these arguments in the wake of Shaw.
Given the variety of considerations which go into the drawing of
district lines, then, the Shaw Court's allusion to Justice Stewart's
now-famous standard for defining obscenity-"I know it when I see
it"'159-fails to explain why geographic compactness should be able to
defeat a Shaw attack. Thus, the majority's opinion contains absolutely no tangible standards by which the lower courts may determine
when "a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its
face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 'segregat[e] ... voters' on the basis of race" 16 0 -the prerequisite

156.
157.

158.
159.
160.

nate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and,
through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation
in the legislative halls of the State.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 753.
On remand of Shaw v. Reno, the three-judge district court panel noted precisely
such a correlation, stating, "there are within each of the [majority-minority] districts substantial, relatively high degrees of homogeneity of shared socio-economic-hence political-interests and needs among its citizens." Shaw v. Hunt,
861 F. Supp. 408, 470 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
See generallyTimur Kuran, Race and Social Mistrust;Seeds of RacialExplosion,
CumNT, Dec. 1993, at 4; Joan R. Rodgers & John L. Rodgers, ChronicPoverty in
the United States, J. OF HuM. REsouRcEs, Jan. 1993, at 25.
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993) (alluding to Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964)).
Id. at 2826.
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405

for requiring a district to undergo strict scrutiny to ensure its

legitimacy.
The Supreme Court's failure to articulate a workable standard for
when the shape of a district will warrant scrutiny under Shaw leaves
all arguably "irregular" majority-minority districts vulnerable to attack. As a result, the Court places the states in the highly precarious
position of second-guessing the aesthetic sensibilities of the federal

courts. States which created majority-minority districts under the judicially-prompted assumption that the Voting Rights Act requires
them are likely to face mounting litigation from voters invoking Shaw.
The creation of new districts which would increase minority governmental representation will in turn be placed on hold pending resolution of the disharmony in voting rights which Shaw creates.
Ultimately, as Justice White explains in his dissent, "the Court's approach... will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's volun16
tary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation."
Paralyzing states in this way will prevent them from constructively
contributing to the "colorblind" electoral ideals which the Shaw majority embraces.
D.

Prospects for the Future

With the legitimacy of majority-minority districts uncertain, states
may now be faced with the challenge of devising other means of ensuring minority representation in government. Indeed, in the immediate
wake of Shaw, modified at-large voting systems, such as single transferrable voting162 or cumulative voting,' 6 3 have received increased at161. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2841 (1993)(White, J., dissenting).
162. Single transferrable voting is a form of proportional representation whereby
"every voter ranks the candidates for all of the positions available in the legislature in order of preference from favorite to least favorite." Alexander Athan Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote with the Voting Rights Act, 92 COLuM. L.
REv. 1810, 1859 (1992). In the event the candidate ranked first does not need the
vote in question, the vote is transferred to the second-choice candidate, and the
process continues as necessary. In order to be elected in a single transferrable
voting system, a candidate must receive a predetermined quota of votes. Id. at
1860. Single transferrable voting is used in at-large districts rather than singlemember districts, yet it eliminates the "winner-take-all" qualities of traditional
at-large districts. Consequently, any group that identifies a "common political
interest" is capable of achieving proportional representation in the legislative
body up for election. Id.
163. Under a cumulative voting scheme, each voter may cast as many votes as there
are seats to be filled in the election. A voter is not restricted to casting only one
vote for a candidate, however, and may "cumulate or aggregate her support by
giving preferred candidates more than one vote." Karlan, supra note 47, at 231.
The opportunity for voters to "plump" their votes, along with a lower threshold of
exclusion of candidates from the election, makes it easier for the interests of politically-cohesive groups to elect candidates of their choice without the help of majority-minority districts. Guinier, supra note 51, at 1461-67.
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tention from states searching for legitimate alternatives to
districting.164 Under these systems, "voters, rather than districtdrawers, determine with whom they will unite to elect representatives."' 65 Thus, if minorities find they have more in common with
other members of their minority group than with their geographic
neighbors, this preference will be recognized through voting patterns
instead of through manipulation of district lines. This "self-identity"
of shared interests is therefore said to ensure that group interests are
fairly represented in government while at the same time eliminate the
need for states to engage in race-based districting to accomplish similar ends.
It is true that alternative voting methods seem to avoid at least
some of the concerns expressed by the Court in Shaw while still maintaining the integrity of empowerment visions expressed throughout
the Court's vote dilution cases and the provisions of the Voting Rights
Act. Nevertheless, experimentation with new electoral systems is not
an easy task and will not in any event completely evade the uneasiness which Shaw leaves behind. Adoption of what some consider to be
complicated voting systems is difficult to accomplish in the face of
well-established districting traditions; consequently, support for experimentation among state and local governing bodies remains tenuous at best.166 Moreover, even those with realistic prospects of
reinventing their electoral systems realize that the nature of alterna164. Alternative voting systems have traditionally been credited as legitimate electoral alternatives only in academic circles. See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 51, at
1416-76; Alan Howard & Bruce Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights ActRecognizing the Emerging Political Equality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1615,
1658-60 (1983); Karlan, supra note 47, at 221-36. Among the arguments for alternative voting systems advanced by leading voting rights scholars, Guinier's
arguments are perhaps most compelling and, at the same time, most controversial. In one particularly insightful work, Guinier argues for alternative voting
methods as a means of combatting the failure of the majority-minority district to
fully accomplish the original goals found in the provisions of the Voting Rights
Act. According to Guinier, the majority-minority district fell short of these goals
by shifting the focus of the Act from minority empowerment to a "head count" of
the number of black representatives in legislative bodies across the country. This
"head-count" analysis, which Guinier designates as the "theory of black electoral
success," ignores the tendency of those legislative bodies to treat minorities
elected from majority-minority districts as token representatives. Thus, despite
an increase in the number of minority representatives in government, those representatives remain marginalized from large parts of the legislative decisionmaking process, and are powerless to advance the unique interests of minority
groups. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. Rv. 1077 (1991).
165. Karlan, supra note 47, at 226.
166. Fortunately, while alternative systems are difficult to implement, states are not
without models for their development. For an account of the use, success, and
constitutionality of alternative voting systems in the United States, see Karlan,
supra note 47, at 223-36.
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live voting systems limits their effectiveness outside of county or city
government elections. Therefore, regardless of any reform which
could be implemented at the local level, single-member districting
would remain the most likely means of apportioning seats in state legislatures and in the United States House of Representatives. Consequently, the need for the Court to provide more manageable standards
than those it advanced in Shaw remains very real.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Shaw establishes a distinct tension between the group empowerment goals of the Voting Rights Act
and the newly-recognized goals of "colorblind" electoral processes expressed in Shaw. Unfortunately, it fails to address the crucial issue of
how that tension should be resolved. The Court's subjective geographic standards are of little help to states as they strive to comply
with the dictates of the Act and the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
With the boundaries of Shaw still largely undefined, it is impossible to know whether, as many fear, the Court has truly laid the
groundwork for a full-scale attack on all majority-minority districts.
In upcoming terms, the Supreme Court will have ample opportunities
to develop principles for its newly-created equal protection claim and
re-evaluate its commitment to "full and effective participation" of all
citizens in the electoral systems and legislative bodies across the country.16 7 Only when these principles are firmly in place will the unfulfilled objectives of the right to vote-"the essence of a democratic
society"'16-be fully realized.
Jennifer L. Gilg '95

167. At the time of this writing, redistricting decisions in several of the nation's lower

courts had begun to set up the court's clarification of the boundaries of Shaw v.

Reno. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Shaw v.
Hunt, 864 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994) Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D.

Tex. 1994); Hays v. State, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994).
168. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).

